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JORDAN: HUSSEIN FEELS ISOLATED IN PEACE EFFORTS

Rogers Visit Hailed. Jordan has reacted enthusiastically to reports that Secretary Rogers will visit Amman during his forthcoming tour of the Middle East. This warm reception reflects King Hussein's extreme anxiety over "being left out" of peace efforts for some time and is probably occasioned by the expectation that the Secretary will assure the King that Jordanian interests are not being ignored. Hussein has, in fact, felt increasingly isolated from the peacemaking process since the UAR accepted the US ceasefire proposal last summer. His anxiety was subsequently heightened as Jordan's involvement in peace efforts was adversely affected last fall by the deterioration of relations with Cairo after Nasser's death and the strong denunciations of Jordan by other Arab states in the wake of Jordan's war against the fedayeen.

No Rapport with the New Egypt. Hussein devoted considerable time and painstaking energy after the 1967 war to effecting a rapprochement with Nasser, reflecting the King's view that a special relationship with the UAR leader was Jordan's only means of reaching a reasonable settlement with Israel. However much the King wished to enter into negotiations, he realized that it was politically impossible for him to do unless the

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UAR led the way. After Nasser's death, Hussein was uncertain about the attitudes of the new leaders toward a settlement and, equally important, their capability to move in that direction. Although he was initially assured that they would seek peace, Hussein has become increasingly frustrated over their continued failure to confide in him as Nasser usually had done. Hussein stopped in Cairo to exchange views on settlement developments prior to his visit to the US last December, but that has been his only meeting with President Sadat.

A serious irritant in Jordanian-UAR relations is Premier Wasfi al-Tal, who has long been anathema in Cairo and whose appointment was severely criticized by the UAR. Tal was named to form a cabinet in late October to ensure more efficient governmental administration, especially in implementing the ceasefire agreement reached with the fadayeen. King Hussein canceled a scheduled trip to Cairo last February rather than accede to a demand by the Egyptian government that Tal not accompany him. Hussein was further upset by Sadat's February 4 proposal for reopening the Suez Canal. The Jordanians had no advance knowledge of it and are highly suspicious that it portends a partial settlement for the UAR with Jordan left holding an empty bag.

Effect of Federation Unclear. Hussein may well have ambivalent feelings about how the nascent Federation of Arab Republics (Egypt-Syria-Libya) will affect settlement efforts. On the one hand, Egypt might be able to mute the extremist positions of its two partners; but,

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on the other hand, Egypt might become inhibited by their intransigence and abandon peace efforts. Either way, Hussein is likely to regard Jordan's position as too vulnerable to offer much hope for a just and honorable peace.

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